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1 Introduction
This paper deals with the overlapping générations (OLG) model with pro
duction and altruistic agents. We adopt Barro's (1974) formalization of the
bequest motive : parents care about their children's welfare, and possibly
leave them a bequest. Importantly, the bequest is restricted to be non-
negative. Barro's debt neutrality theorem hinges on the existence of an
equilibrium with positive bequests. Indeed, if bequests are constrained the
Ricardian équivalence resuit does not hold and there are important effects
associated with public debt.
Abel (1987) and Weil (1987) show that bequests are positive if and
only if the intensity of altruism is sufficiently strong. Nevertheless, their cha-
racterization of equilibrium rests on the assumption of existence, uniqueness
and stability of the steady state of the Diamond (1965) model.
It could be deduced from this resuit that an increase in the degree
of altruism leads to an increase in the stationary level of bequests. Since
Abel (1987) and Weil (1987), it is a widespread opinion that existence and
uniqueness of a stable steady state in Diamond's model are sufficient to
ensure a such property.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relevance of this opinion.
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We begin to show that an increase in the degree of altruism leads to a
decrease in the stationary level of bequests if the concavity of the production
function is strong enough at the modified golden rule steady state.
In this case, intuitively, a small increase in the modified golden rule
steady state implies a large decrease in the interest factor but a small in
crease in the level of savings of parents. Hence, this worsening of their saving
income is such that parents bequeath less although their bequest motive is
stronger.
Finally, we provide an example showing that assumptions made by
Abel (1987) and Weil (1987) are not sufficient to rule out this case.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the OLG model
with production and altruistic préférences. Section 3 contains our results.
Conclusions are gathered in Section 4.
2 The model
Consider a perfectly compétitive economy which extends over infinité dis
crète time. Population consists of altruistic agents who are identical within
as well as across générations and live for two periods. Young altruists supply
a fixed amount of labor, receive the market wage Wt, inherit Xt, consume et,
and save st. When old they consume dt+\, a part of the proceeds of their
savings, and bequeath the remainder, xt+\, to their child. Both periods'
consumption (ct, dt+i) are normal goods. Let Rt+i be the (real) factor of
interest. Thus, agents face the constraints :
xt+wt=ct+st and Rt+ist = dt+i +xt+l (1)
Vt xt^0 (2)
where négative bequests are prohibited by condition (2).
Parents are altruistic with respect to their child. They care about their
child's welfare by weighting their child's utility in their own utility function.
Indeed, an altruistic agent who inherits xt has a utility function Vt of the
form :
Vt(xt) = max {U{ct,dt+i)+0Vt+i{xt+i)}
ct,dt-t-i,xt + i
where U(c, d) is his life cycle utility and Vt+i{xt+i) dénotes the utility of his
descendant when he inherits xt+i- The intergenerational degree of altruism
is represented by 0 G (0,1).
The utility function U(c, d) is strictly concave, twice continuously dif-
ferentiable over R^2 and satisfies U'c{c,d) > 0, U'd{ctd) > 0. lim U'c{c,d) =
+oc, and lim U'd(c,d) = -f-oo.
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An altruist who inherits x( solves Vt{xt) subject to (1) and (2).
The saving fnnction st = s(wt + xt,xt+i,Rt+i) is given by
st = argmaxU(wt + xt- s,Rt+is - xt+i)
S
The output produced at time t using capital Kt and labor Lt, is governed by
a production function with constant returns to scale F(Kt,Lt) = Ltf(kt)
where kt = Kt/Lt. The function / is concave, strictly monotonie, and twice
continuously differentiable for k > 0. Capital fully dépréciâtes after one
period. Compétition in the markets for capital and labor services ensures
that each factor is paid its marginal product :
wt = f(kt)-ktf'(kt) and Rt = f'(kt) (3)
Capital stock of period t+1 is financed by saving of period t Le. kl+\ = st.
3 The results
Recently, we hâve shown in Thibault (2000) that, unlike the Diamond model
(see Galor and Ryder, 1989), the OLG model with altruistic agents always
expériences a non-trivial steady state. we can distinguish two kinds of steady
state whether bequests are positive or nil.
When we consider the standard case where Diamond economy has a
unique and stable steady state (k.*,R*), the condition for positive bequests
is the well-known condition exhibited by Abel (1987) and Weil (1987) :
,8 > 1/R*
In such a case there exists a threshold value of the degree of altruism
above which altruists leave bequest. According to conventional wisdom the
bequest left by an agent increases w.r.t. his degree of altruism above this
threshold. A widespread opinion actually is that the existence and the uni-
queness of a stable steady state in the Diamond model are sufficient to
prevent the converse and rather counterintuitive resuit (see Abel (1987
p. 1042)1).
When the model has a steady state with positive bequests, the sta-
tionary capital stock is the modified golden rule steady state capital k =
f'~l(l/p). Then, according to (3), stationary wage and interest rate are
w = f(k) - k/3 and R = 1//3, respectively. We begin our study by deriving
Abel (1987) : 'To avoid any complications that may arise from multiple locally stable steady states, I follow
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a necessary and sufficient condition under which the degree of altruism is
negatively related to the level of bequests.
Proposition 1 Let s'^ = s'^w + x, —x,R) the derivative of s w.r.t. its i-th
argument evaluated at the modified golden rule steady state.
An increase in the degree of altruism results in a decrease in the sta
tionary level of bequests if and only if \f"{k)\ > l/[ks[ — s'3] > 0.
Proof. Let w{k) = f{k) - kf'{k) and R(k) = f'(k).
Since k = s(w(k)+x, -x, R(k)) and using the implicit function theo-
rem, x can be written as a function of k, R(k) and w(k). Hence, according
to (3), there exists $ such that : x = <l?(fc, f(k), ff{k)).
Since k = s(w(k) + x, —x,R(k)) we hâve : dx/dk = [1 — (w's\ +
•ft'*3)]/(^i — ^l- Since k = /'~1(4) is increasing w.r.t. /?, dx/dfi and dx/dk
hâve the same sign. Since c and d are normal goods we hâve s[ > 0 and s'2 <
0. Therefore dx/d/3 lias the sign of 1 - (w's[ + Rrê'3) Le. 1 + f"{k)(ks[ - s'3).
Hence, If sf3 > ks[ then dxfdfi is positive. If £3 < ks^ then dx/d{3 is négative
if and only if |/"(jfe)| > l/[ks[ - s'3]. a
Note that s'3 < ks^ is a necessary condition so that the degree of al
truism is negatively related to the level of bequests. Since both periods' con-
sumptions are normal goods we hâve s[ > 0. Then, the previous necessary
condition is satisfied if 53 is négative. We focus now on the Cobb-Douglas
case in which s'3 is négative to give an économie intuition of proposition 1.
Corollary 1 Let the life cycle utility function be Cobb-Douglas.2
The degree of altruism is negatively related to the level of bequests if
and only if\f"{k)\ is sufficiently high.
Proof. If U{ct,dt+i) = \nct + 7\ndt+i we hâve : s(wt + xt, -xt+i,Rt+i) =
[~f/(l+'y)](wt+Xt)+xt+1/[(l+'y)Rt+i\. Hence, s[ > 0 and S3 ^ 0. Since s'3 <
ks[, according to proposition 1, dx/dj3 is négative if and only if |/"(fc)| >
l/[ks[ - s'3], According to (3) and since x = $(fc,/(fc),/'(fc)), s^ dépends
on k, f(k), and f'(k). Hence, there exists \& such that dx/d/3 is négative if
and only if \f"{k)\ > *(fc,/(fc),/'(fc)) > 0. d
An increase in the degree of altruism results in a decrease in the sta
tionary level of bequests if the concavity of the production function is strong
enough at the modified golden rule steady state. Intuitively, an infinitésimal
increase in the modified golden rule steady state leads to decrease the in-
terest factor but does not significantly change the stationary level of saving
of parents. Hence, when the concavity of the production function is strong
enough at the modified golden rule steady state the worsening of their sa-
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ving income, Rs is such that parents bequeath less although their bequest
motive is stronger.3
Note that our argument is not based on a small variation in (3 since
such variation may hâve, depending on the properties of /, a strong effect on
the saving behavior. On the contrary, a small increase in the capital stock
k implies an infinitésimal increase in saving s and simplifies the analysis of
the behavior of altruist.
Indeed, since there is complète dépréciation of the capital stock, then
second period income equals kf'(k). Whether this increases or decreases as
k goes to the golden rule capital stock dépends on the production func
tion.4 Clearly with uAk" production this expression increases but with a
production function whose gradient quickly approaches zéro as ,8 goes to
one, this expresion will tend to zéro. Thus an increase in saving (altruism)
will actually reduce second period consumption (bequests).5
From corollary 1, we can construct a production function satisfying
the Inada conditions and the assumptions of Abel (1987) and Weil (1987)
such that an increase in the degree of altruism results in a decrease in the
stationary level of bequests.
Example 1 Consider an economy described by the Cobb-Douglas utility
function U(c, d) = | lnc + \ \x\.d and the production function :
12 + bk- k\nk for 0 < k < 4
(62+ § In2 - \ In3) k - 2k\nk - 1 for 6 < k ^ 12
Ak* + B for k > 12
where A = 12§(12 - § In2 - f In3) and B = 36In 2 + 601n3 - 73.
The stationary level of bequests x is represented as a function ofP in figure 1.
0,5
Degree of altruism
Figure 1 : Bequests and the intergenerational degree of altruism
3 Although their wage rate has also increased, this additional income is used to increase their first period
consumption.
4 When /? tends to one, k goes to /'~1(1) the golden rule capital stock.
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This example shows that Abel (1987) and Weil (1987) assumptions are
fully compatible with the concavity assumption which ensures that degree
of altruism is negatively related to the level of bequests.
4 Conclusion
We hâve considered an overlapping générations model with production and
altruistic agents initially developed by Barro (1974). We hâve shown that,
contrary to the intuition of Abel (1987) and Weil (1987), an increase in the
degree of altruism can resuit in a decrease in the stationary level of bequests
even if the Diamond model has a unique and stable steady state. To rule out
this counterintuitive case, an assumption on the curvature of the production
function is necessary.
Appendix A : Computational détails of Example 1
/ is continuous, differentiable, /' is continuously, positive and /" is négative.
Indeed :
/'(*) = R(k) =
4-lnfc if 0< A: ^ 4
4 + 31n2--lnÀ: if4<fc<6
4+4ln2--Lm3-21n/c if 6 < k < 12
A_
L 3~





if 0 < Jt ^4
if 4 < k ^ 6
if 6 < fc ^ 12





if 0 < k ^ 4
if 4 < k ^ 6
if 6 < k ^ 12
B Lf fc > 12
Hence w(k) and R(k) are continuous functions.
With U(ct, dt+i) = \ In ct + \ \ndt+i we hâve :
s (wt + xt, - + xt + -=
Rt+i }
Then the saving of the econorny without bequest sf satisfies : sf = \wt.Emmanuel Thibault 137




















This implies that the Diamond model expériences a unique and globally
stable (non trivial) steady-state equilibrium kD where kD = 2.
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